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CENTRAL ASIA AND CHINA RELATIONS:
IMPLICATIONS TO INDIA
By P.Stobdan (India)
China has come a long way in the perspicaciously translating the political
challenges emanating from Central Asia, in the face of the Soviet implosion,
into one of economic opportunities. In fact, until the 9/11-episode, China scored
consecutive diplomatic successes unparallel compared to other international
actors in the region. Beijing’s initial apprehension ranged from ideological
isolation to cope up with transnational ethnic resurgence. China was cautious
with the events unfolding in Central Asia, describing them as “internal affairs”.
Chinese were, in fact, perturbed and took defensive postures, adopting even
strident tone to forestall any adverse effect on China.  Chinese Vice-President,
Wang Zhen’s instruction in August 1991 to PLA troops in Xinjiang to “form a
steel wall to safeguard socialism and the unification of the motherland” was
seen in response to the Soviet collapse.1
China’s strategic perceptions of Central Asia
However, as the dust of Soviet collapse settled down, China saw Central
Asian new political environment changing in its favor.  Chinese experts were
quick to assess the evolving trends and argued that there is no need for “excessive
reactions” since Central Asia Was unlikely to see the situation faced by the
Baltic States.2  Moreover, China realized that its security environment has rather
improved and instead made strategic gains on a number of fronts:
· A formidable super-power and its principal military and ideological
competitor, which since mid-1960s had tried to encircle China and undermined
China’s periphery in conjunction with Vietnam, Mongolia, India and
Afghanistan, has disappeared.
· Russia’s preoccupation with the West compounded by internal political
an economic crises significantly diminished Chinese threat perception of Russia.
1 P.Stobdan, “China’s Central Asia Dilemma”, Strategic analyses, Vol.XXII No. 3, June, 1998. Also see
John W.Garver, “The Chinese Communist Party and Collapse of Soviet Union”, The China Quarterly-133,
March 1993, pp. 96-110.
2 Based on discussion author had at the Beijing Institute for Strategic Studies (BIIS), China Institute of
Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) and other important Chinese institutions in China in 1992.
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· Reduction in Russia’s armed forces,  the strategic nuclear  weapons
and  the Pacific fleet by 40 per cent, as well as Kazakhstan’s commitment to
eliminate nuclear weapon on its soil has titled the military balance in China’s
favor.3
· Smaller national armies completely asymmetrical to China’s
deployment in Xinjiang replaced the Soviet military in Central Asia. The Central
Military Commission (CMC) annual report in 1991 did not mention Central
Asian Republics as direct challenge to China’s national security.3
· As the initial euphoria died down, China took a sanguine view about
the threat of Islamic fundamentalism. Beijing, in fact, was pleased to see central
Asian governments themselves standing up against the rising Islamic opposition.
Central Asian armies soon got engaged in fighting fundamentalist forces.
Moreover, Beijing quickly turned to its old Islamic friends, including the
Talibans to spare China from fundamentalist drive in exchange of clandestine
nuclear and missile programmes. China took Iranian President, Rafsanjani to
Urumchi, the capital of XIANJIANG in 1992.
It was against this backdrop China approached Central Asian states and
established diplomatic relations with them in accordance with its “Five Principles
of Peaceful Coexistence” while obtaining Central Asian endorsement of China
control over Xinjiang and Taiwan. Between 1992-1993, the new states signed
all necessary bilateral agreements for cooperation with China.
As the Soviet built economic infrastructure began to disarray, Chinese
were quick to reaped advantage in the region’s economic sector. Central Asian
leaders were unable to ignore China’s economic achievements while China
added the metaphor  “Revival of the Silk Road” to its open door policy for
bolstering its interest in the region. The Silk Road did fulfill Central Asian
immediate commercial needs, reminding them as also about the prosperity and
thriving Central Asian culture of the past. The concept of Silk Road as the
ancient continental bridge did help China remove key political and cultural
barriers. China capitalized on the concept and implemented a number of
ambitious projects including the construction of transnational railways and
highways, enabling it to bring huge trade and investment in the region.4 In
3 Guocang Huan, “The New Relationship with the former Soviet Union,” Current History, September
1992, p.254. The New Russian President, Yeltsin,s pronouncements were viewed by Chinese Leaders not only
as anti–Communists but also as hostile to the leadership in Beijing. At several occasion, Chinese humiliated
Yeltsin  and supported Gorbachev with regards to changes in the former Soviet Union. In 1989, Chinese
Communist Party General Secretary, Jiang Zemin refused to meet Yeltsin in Moscow.
4 Ross H.Monro, “China’s Waxing Spheres of Influence” Orbis, Fall 1994, pp. 590-605.
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April 1994, Chinese Premier Li Peng’s triumphal tour to the region gave a new
impetus by proposing a pipeline along the Silk Road.5
China treated carefully in Central Asia, so as not to arouse Russia’s suspi-
cion. Beijing avoided direct political confrontation and enhanced only economic
leverages. Once the Russians decided to sell their advanced weapon system to
China, Beijing also went ahead to bolster ties with Central Asian states in tech-
nical and military fields, building direct and indirect linkages with Central Asian
key military firms. Even in the “Great Game” of pipeline politics, China stepped
in only in 1997 after the Americans entered the region.
Although, there are several dimensions of Central Asia – China relations,
I will limit myself to discussing only issues relating the Shanghai Five, the linchpin
of China’s strategy in Central Asia. While the Central Asian states offer vast
economic opportunities–a hub for energy distribution and new regional coop-
eration schemes, the region is still rife with enormous threats to China. This
paper intends to explore the nuances attached to Central Asia – China relations,
specifically, the nature and current status of Shanghai Five, now called as the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). I would argue in the paper that de-
spite the laud projection of the SCO as a viable regional grouping, China would
fail to attain the leadership role in Central Asia.
The Shanghai Five
The Shanghai Five came as a product of post-Cold War development in
Eurasia. Several key factors underpinned its evolution. Firstly, it was borne out
of China’s rising insecurity along its frontiers, especially the pending territorial
disputes having potential of invoking strong nationalistic resurgence. The do-
mestic political stability was a concern for the Central Asian states too. They
found commonality of  interest with China in fighting against religious extrem-
ism, although China held different view on the Alghan imbroglio. For China, the
international isolation in the wake of the Tianamen Incident and the rising mili-
tary tension in the Taiwan Strait was a matter of serious concern. When the West
started to project China as a potential threat to Asian security, Beijing looked
for support to build a multi-polar world as against US proclaimed “new world
order”.
The Shanghai Five came about in the backdrop of Russia’s declining
international status. Russia was grappled with the period of serious domestic
political upheaval and economic hardship. The Western pressure on Russian
5 See summary of World Broadcasts, SWB/FE/1978 G/1 April 22,1994.
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Human Rights records, especially on the Chechnya question and NATO’s
eastward enlargement posed serious challenges to Russia’s security, and hence
became compelling factor for Russia to engage the Chinese.6 The Central Asian
states too could not take risk on their external front, especially when the political
authorities faced mounting domestic challenges from diverse ethnic and religious
elements. The soviet strategic withdrawal had left Central Asian states with
feeble armies incapable of defending large borders with China. Moreover, the
need for them to gain international legitimacy and diversify from Russian control
was uppermost national priority. The declining Russia-India nexus even in the
economic and commercial spheres helped widen Central Asia corridor for
Chinese economic penetration.  The prolonged Afghan conflict only hindered
Central Asia states to look for outside support other than China. Moreover, the
inter-state rivalries arising out of dispute over land and water had made some
Central Asian states to look towards China. Therefore, the Shanghai Initiative
came in the face of international disorder-desperate groups trying to overcome
their inherent national weaknesses.
As China started to set the agendas, the commentators described the
Shanghai phenomenon to China applying old imperialistic methods- i.e., “divide
and rule” with new realities.7 The group was formed in 1996, ostensibly to provide
a platform for addressing the joint border issues.8 From the outset, China tried to
deal individually with Central Asian states and resolve the problems bilaterally
as against Russian and   Central Asian insistence to represent as a “joint
delegation”. Following the Summit, China, however, managed in July 1996 to
sign an agreement bilaterally with Kyrgyzstan to resolve the border issue.
The Second Summit held in Moscow in April 1997 had focused only on
disarmament and reduction of forces along the borders. It was the time when
the Russian forces were already making speedy withdrawal and the Central
Asian attentions   were increasingly getting diverted to fight Islamic oppositions.
The Third Summit held in July 1998 focused on non-military issues that
concerned China. Among others, the joint declaration stressed for respecting
national sovereignty and territorial integrity, fight against separatists and
religious extremists. China also pushed the economic agenda. It was also on
6 Boris Yeltsin during his visit to China in December 1999 warned by saying “he, (Clinton) must have
forgotten for a moment what Russia is. It has a full arsenal of nuclear weapons”. While responding to Clinton’s
tough remarks on Chechnya , Yeltsin said “everything will be as I agreed with Chinese President , Jiang Zemin
and we will dictate how to live’. Reuters, Moscow, December 9, 1999
7 Richard Walsh. J.,”China and the New Geopolitics of Central Asia”, Asian Survey, Vol.XXXIII, No.
3, March 1993.
8 Commentary “The agreement that holds the world’s attention”, April 27, 1996.
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occasion for China to provoke Central Asian states to harshly condemn the
nuclear tests in South Asia. By this time, China managed to divide the 3+1 joint
delegation into separate individual member states and declared the forum a
truly multi lateral. This time China concluded a separate treaty with Kazakhstan
on the basis of one signed in 1994 to resolve the territorial disputes along
Xinjiang frontiers.
The Fourth Summit held in Bishkek in August 1999 was a mere declarative.
The document reaffirmed their commitment for non-interference and not to
allow their territories to be used against others interests. China then quickly
singed a supplementary agreement with Kyrgyzstan to resolve the border issue.
The Fifth Summit was postponed several times amidst uncertainty over
how the post-Yeltsin Russia would view relationship with China. The Summit
was finally held in Dushanbe in July 2000 with Uzbekistan joining as an observer.
The meeting was crucial as it promised to redefine the contours of future Russia-
China relations. The tentativeness was over when Putin decided to continue
with Yeltsin, policy for a strategic alliance with China. However, unlike Yeltsin,
who took a soft-pedaling on Central Asia, Putin came to Shanghai meeting
after doing some homework. Putin first took measures to strengthen the CIS,
engaged Uzbekistan in a military relationship, worked with Kyrkyzstan to tighten
its borders with Tajikstan, decided to establish a regional joint terrorism center
and participated in Southern Shield 2000 military exercises. Moscow’s increased
regional involvement, coupled with Uzbekistan’s inclusion in the group raised
the hope Shanghai Five becoming a strong organization that would involve in
joint operation against Islamic Militants. But the meeting ended up with decision,
which were general, declarative and non-committal in nature. The anchors of
the grouping only used the occasion to make “anti-West” and more precisely
“anti-US” rhetoric in the wake of US decision to cancel the 1972 ABM treaty
and called it “Shanghai Forum”. Yet again, China signed a separate agreement,
this time with Tajikistan to settle the border issue permanently.
The Sixth summit held in Shanghai in June 2001 welcomed Uzbekistan
as a full member, and even discussed about expanding  the membership to
bring in South Asian countries. Pakistan had already expressed willingness to
join it earlier. Interestingly, Russia and Central Asian states insisted that the
organization become Shanghai Cooperation organization (SCO). China first
opposed the transformation but agreed for the change only after the election of
Bush as the US President.9
9 “Russia has Misgiving about Shanghai Cooperation Organization”, Eurasia Net, June 20. 2001
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 The sixth summit took place amidst heightened concern about Central
Asian security, as regional countries, especially Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan battle
to contain mounting pressure from Islamic insurgents. While the western media
described the SCO as an “anti-separatist club”, Putin said they were against a
basket of evils: religious extremism, terrorism, organized crime and drug traf-
ficking. Putin noted that “Russia’s withdrawal from Central Asian region after
the Soviet disintegration created a power vacuum, and religious extremism and
terrorist organizations began filling the vacuum. “ But once again Russian and
Chinese distaste for TMD overshadowed their genuine concern of radical Is-
lam. Though, the members graciously welcomed President Karimov of
Uzbekistan, the officials both in Moscow and in other capitals of Central Asian
states showed   misgivings about Uzbekistan’s entry. They, particularly, saw the
risk of Tashkent complicating rather than resolving Central Asian security prob-
lem. The dilemma created by Uzbekistan after it pulled out from the Collective
Security Treaty (CST) in 1998 was fresh in their mind. But Uzbekistan had to
join the SCO as result of rising threat from the IMU that made series of incur-
sions through two summers. By this time the SCO became a unique cocktail –
each members pursuing different aims. The only converging point of interest
was containing of Islamic fundamentalism. Problems in Chechnya, Xinjiang,
Batken, Osh, Farghana etc., became good reference point. It was then the SCO
started attracting new Delhi’s attention too for a membership. But this was a
scenario prior to the 9/11 incidents. In fact, interest for membership showed by
India, Iran and Mongolia only helped boost the SCO’s credibility.
Post September 11 and the SCO
In the aftermath of 9/11, the SCO’s relevance and viability became a mat-
ter of increasing debate. The Seventh Summit, which met in St. Petersburg in
June 2002, desperately searched for a unifying operational framework. The
meeting approved a 26-point charter to base the SCO secretariat in Beijing and
to establish an anti-terrorism center in Bishkek. The joint declaration stressed
that global order should be based on “mechanisms of collective decision-mak-
ing and democratization of international relations.”10  The focus now appeared
to have shifted from fighting Islamic fundamentalism to that of dealing with the
US presence in Central Asia. The St. Petersburg meeting clearly witnessed broad
difference among the members concerning the strategic priorities of the organi-
zation. The 9/11 terrorists attack and their aftermath completely exposed the
10 Sergei Blagov, “SCO Continues to Search Operational Framework”, Eurasia Net, June 11, 2002
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SCO’s earlier commitment to stand against growing US unilateralism. One after
another member states led Uzbekistan offered military bases to the US. There
were no multilaterial consultations among SCO members prior to the arrival of
US troops in Central Asia, except that Putin had telephonic conversation with
the leaders of Central Asian states. Moreover, the tone in St. Petersburg had
changed as the declaration favored a move towards “new and stable Afghani-
stan, free from terror, war, drugs and poverty” Russian Foreign Minister sug-
gested member  states to cooperate with the US in promoting stability in Af-
ghanistan. The organization that earlier routinely attacked the US has now started
reverting to developing interstate trade component. Nevertheless, China tried to
revive the original spirit and sought to make SCO the region’s authoritative
voice. Chinese Foreign, Minister Tang Jianxuan promised to reporters in Mos-
cow in June 2002 that SCO would achieve international significance. He noted
that the SCO is not “ a club for empty discussions, but a viable institution ca-
pable to make an important contribution to the international war on terror.”
Beijing was also keen that other regional bodies in Central Asia do not grow at
the expense of the SCO. China has been taking somewhat restrained interest in
the CICA process initiated by Kazakhstan. Jian Zemin decided to attain the
Almaty Summit in June 2002 only after Prime Minister Vajpayee confirmed his
participation.
Undoubtedly, the US led war against terrorism has completely demolished
the relevance of SCO. The Chinese driven organization got discredited in the
face of 9/11 episodes as the member states instead turned to Washington to
fight against fundamentalism. In fact, the 9/11 fully exposed the China’s duplicity
of fighting terrorism at home while maintaining full Liaison with the Taliban
and Pakistan, which long sustained terrorism as their state policy. Beijing
preached the SCO members to resists fundamentalism, but when came to real
action, it chose to abstain from the UN sanction against the Taliban. While
responding to 9/11, China sought complete evidence from the US that Al-Qaida
had indeed launched the attacks. This was an enough message that China cannot
be a serious partner in war against terror.
Notwithstanding the euphoria associated with its achievements, there are
little signs the SCO becoming a counterweight to the US hegemony. Though,
the organization boasts about adhering to pragmatic and incremental approach
to multilaterial problems, most delicate issues were resolved bilaterally. Central
Asian states too owing to inter-state rivalry adopted bilateral rather than
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multilaterial channels. The Sino-Russian bilateral affairs, including the weapon
transactions overshadows the scope of the SCO.
It is being strongly argued that Central Asian states reached border
delimitation and also water sharing agreements with China without ever
consulting Moscow. The border issue, particularly Kyrgyzstan’s ceding to China
about 125.000 hectares of territory has recently led to large-scale public violence,
resulting into killing of a Chinese diplomat in Bishkek. The border issue has
now become emotional and continues to remain the cause for internal instability
there. This may also happen in Kazakhstan eventually, were the authority is
being accused of ceding large chunk of territory to China.
There are also little hopes that the SCO could cooperate in economic af-
fairs in a major way. The smaller SCO members like Kyrgyzstan fears that its
resources such as minerals, fuel and water will become vulnerable to exploita-
tion by bigger members. Water is already a critical political issue in Central
Asia. Some states are using water as a political tool. Not just grubbing of land,
China is being accused of diverting Central Asian major river waters for the
development of Western China. The Emel River that flowed into Kazakhstan
has already dried up. China is said to be using “divisive” tactic even on the
Black Irtysh issue between China-Kazakhstan and Russia.
The differing strategic perceptions among the member states also seri-
ously hinder the SCO’s growth. Uzbekistan’s complete alignment with the US
after the 9/11 has dampened the organization’s spirit. Others are viewing
Uzbekistan as a fickle member as Tashkent started to skip the SCO sessions.
Even before the 9/11, Karimov had indicated that the SCO should largely re-
main a forum for debate on global political issues. Uzbekistan is likely to con-
tinue with its unilaterial approach in confronting Islamic radicalism. Tashkent’s
independent action in the past to the ward the IMU has fueled inter-state ten-
sions. Notably, the decision to time its frontiers with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan
caused considerable distrust and animosity between them. Such rivalries even
mired CIS effort at countering Islamic resurgence. The SCO has shown neither
the inclination nor capabilities to resolve these disputes.
Russia’s Renewed Interest in Central Asia
There are little doubts that Putin’s ascendancy since 2000 has further di-
luted the importance of the SCO. Russia, under Putin, has been increasingly
pushing both military and economic as key leverages to promote its interest in
Central Asia. In the last two years, Russia has mutely regained control over
Central Asian key sectors including oil, space, minerals, defense industry. More-
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over, Moscow has made incisive policy response-insinuating US entry in Cen-
tral Asia enhancing rather than threatening Russian national interests. The gains
on security apart, Russian perceive US engagement, especially in the energy
sector, would bring dividend in the longer run, so long as Russia controls the
supply routes. Central Asians themselves have reaped enormous benefits by
cooperating with the US in its war on terror. Not just the US aid to them has
doubled; military cooperation begets resourses to revitalize Central Asian key
military segments. In this context, Russian’s now see situation in its “near abroad”
changed fundamentally. Russians do not seemingly see disputes with West van-
ishing completely, but the nature of differences and Western compliance to con-
cede Russia’s viewpoints have altered conciderably.11 Russia now finds more
reasons to return to Central Asia. Putin is skillfully using the American rhetoric
with its emphasis on the anti-terrorism campaign and right of preemptive ac-
tion. The opening of new Russia military base at Kant airport in Kyrgyzstan on
5 Desember underscores Moscow’s intension to remain as dominant regional
power in Central Asia. Putin termed it as achieving “a new quality” to regional
security arrangements, while Central Asian are beginning to see “no alterna-
tive” to Russian support. Besides the air unit, Russian  troops will form part of
rapid-deployment force to be stationed in Kyrgyzstan under the CST. Putin him-
self said in November 2002 to Ekho Moscvy Radio, “that the era of Russian
political concessions–which began with 1991 and continued through the post-
September 11 appearance of US military bases in Central Asia – was coming to
an end”.
While Russia and Central Asian states are likely to continue engagement
with China through the SCO, their decision to take the CIS and CST more
seriously than before would significantly undermine the SCO’s relevance. As
the CST observed its 10th anniversary last year, efforts were made to redefine
its relevance. The CST was transformed into Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO) last year with new charter and Russia as dominant player.
The organization conducted a series of large-scale military maneuvers in the
southern belt of Central Asia and in the Caspian Sea. Not surprising that the
SCO’s anti-terrorism center based in Bashkek will have very   limited role to
play in the Central Asian security affairs-collecting information on drug
trafficking and checking trans – border criminal activities.
Washington’s muted response to Russia’s December 5 announcement
indicated that the US no longer views the Russian military deployment in Central
11 Russian Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov’s statement on Russian’s foreign policy concept, spelled out
in November 2002 prior to NATO’s Summit in Prague, Kommersant Daily, Moscow, November 2002.
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Asia as a zero-sum game. The experts opine that Moscow and Washington are
emerging as a twined alternative to Chinese hegemony in Central Asia. The
Russian troops could now complement American troops in Bishkek to
collectively fight the stateless foes such as Al-Quida. Putin is doing what Yeltsin
could not do. The essence of China’s strategy so far, as also those of Central
Asian states was to play on the contradiction between Russia and the West.
This has begun to change now. As Russia’s economy has starting to look up,
Moscow, obviously, is going to implement policies to safeguard its interest.
Central Asian states are recognizing the fact that Russia has gained more
leadership role after the 9/11. President Karimov also acknowledged last year
by saying that “present-day Russia is not the Russia of the 1990s.”
Fear About China
Notwithstanding the public posturing about close Sino-Russian relations,
apprehensions about growing Chinese influence in the region run deep in most
Russian and Central Asian minds. Outside the governments, debate continues
weather China is an ally or a competitor. The Central Asian have historical
reasons to be worry about China. The Chinese word Xi Yu remains a historical
title for China’s Western Provinces that includes much of Central Asia.12 Chinese
Ambassador to Kazakhstan reminded this to them in 1992. The Kazakhs still
have saying “when a black Chinese comes, a yellow Russian would seem appear
father.” Central Asians are keen to cooperate in the new realities but wish to be
vigilant about China’s long- term goals. They fully suspect that China is in
search of lebensraum. Already, the ethnic Chinese are making forays in most
industrial towns in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. The Western Kazakh city like
Aktybinsk has already become a China town. Besides, Chinese have been
encouraging the ethnic Uighurs and Kazakhs migration from Xinjiang to
Kazakhstan. The seriousness of this problem was realized in the recent years,
as the Kazakh authorities decided to shift the capital of Almaty Oblast to
Taldykorgan, closer to China’s border, in order to offset the imbalance being
created by Chinese migration.
There appears to be a limit to what Central Asian could do to prevent the
Uighur movement getting more momentum. In Kazakhstan, several Uighur
12 China had a territorial dispute with Russia since late seventeenth century. During the period of rift
between China and the Soviet Union, Chinese maps showed parts of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan as
far as Lake Balkhash, as well as the Pamirs, within the borders of China. China claimed that Tsarist Russia had
annexed thousands of square miles from China in 1880s. See Michael Freeberne, Essays in Political Geography,
1965, p.203.
 The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs                                            Number10, 2003
82
separatist outfits are now operating legally.13  Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are
home for a large Uighur Diaspora. Many of these outfits, including the United
National Revolutionary Front of Eastern Turkistan (UNRFET), led by Yusupbek
Mukhlisi, have become more vocal in the recent months.  Kazakhstan’s over
200.000 Uighur population is becoming more prosperous and assertive. The
Uighur activities are increasingly threatening to turn into an armed conflict
involving China and Central Asian states. If not handled carefully, the Uighur
issue may re-bounce on Central Asian states. Though, China has evidently gained
in short term in its fight against fight Islamic extremists in Xinjiang, Western
entry in the region with enhanced political interest will inexorably pose long-
term difficulties for China. In fact, Uighurs living outside China beginning to
foresee better times ahead. Beijing now tries to revive the SCO’s spirit and
regain leverages while (a) massing
Troops along Central Asian frontier; (b) providing military assistance to
the states; (c) reviving interest in Central Asian oil. Recently, Beijing did gain
success by resolving territorial disputes with Tajikistan in its favour.
Implication to India
From China’s standpoint, the SCO provides perfect political and economic
mechanism – containing destabilizing effects and obtaining economic benefits.
For Russia, it is a forum that never discounts its interests in Central Asia. Russia
also intends to use the forum only for an economic engagement with China.
For Central Asians, the organization provided higher degree of independence
by playing off Chinese and Russian influence against each other. Therefore,
the SCO essentially provided a delicate equilibrium among the participants in
the post-Cold geopolitical disorder. India has never featured in the equilibrium,
even though Central Asians always perceived India’s potential to be a
countervailing factor in the region. This articulation finds pronouncement both
within and outside governments. Central Asian view India conspicuously lacking
framework or not being able to find itself a place in any of the concentric rings
that outside actors have embossed for dealing with the region.
Central Asia forms a critical and paramount component in India’s security
calculus, both for containing unstable situation in and around Afghanistan and
Pakistan, and against growing China’s influence all around Asia. The West for
long overlooked and discounted India’s historic and strategic connections with
Central Asia. The implications of SCO’s dilution should open Central Asia’s
13“Kazakhstan’s Uighur separatists are “trump card” against Chinese claims” Karavan, Almaty, in Russian,
November 29. 2002.p. 7. Also see BBC Mon CAU 301102 kr/qu.
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door for India. This strategic reversal means India and Russia gaining position
to exploit the US-China contradictions.
New Delhi has been over-emphasizing the importance of the SCO, perhaps
looking at it from a narrow perspective of combating terrorism. China’s interests
in the SCO extend beyond the resolution of its borders to bring the new states
under its strategic fold. In fact, the trends indicate that China has been adopting
a policy scheme of replicating its Pakistan policy in Central Asia. A careful
analysis indicate China’s conceptions moving along a multiple but interrelated
lines of thought; (a) resolve its territorial problems with these states with best
possible terms and conditions, (b) preclude any possible threat that may
challenge its political control over Xinjiang, Ó recognition of region’s
importance and also of various individual states as countering other powers
such as Russia, India and the US.
The SCO was originally meant to resolve the volatile border issues. India,
having mechanisms to deal with China on border issues, does not required to
be in the SCO. Central Asian experiences, in fact, show that China used various
high-handed policies including intimidation, subversions, destabilization and
allurement of individual, groups and states to settle its borders. Fore example,
Kazakhstan resolved its borders in the backdrop of China’s promise to make
multi-billion investments in oil sector and a long-distance pipeline project for
Kazakh oil export to East Asian market. By making the border resolution as a
prerequisite to it, the dispute involving vast stretched of territory was finally
resolved in China‘s favour. The issue still remains a contentious one as
opposition parties; media and intelligentsia vehemently oppose Kazakh authority
for compromising on the border issue. What has been described as the “deal of
the Century” involving 3.4 billion dollars investments by China in Kazakhstan’s
oil sector, signed in 1997 remains a non-starter.  A similar factics is being used
by China on the river-water disputes. For example, on the Irtish river dispute,
the Kazakhs had to make two concessions at the early stage of preparing a
framework for negotiation. Astana has ceded some 500 square kilometers of
territory to China and dropped its earlier insistence  that Russia should also be
a party to the negotiation. (The river flows from China via Kazakhstan into the
Russian federation). By managing to solve problems with Central Asian states,
China by wishes to single out India on the border issue.
 On the issue of terrorism too, China cannot be taken as a reliable partner.
In fact, China has been a part and not a solution to terrorism. In Central Asia,
China though tended to avoid direct face-off with Russia, but adhered to other
subversive means including Islamic militancy to the point of coercing individual
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Central Asian governments to come to terms with Beijing. It is quite clear that
Chinese in connivance with Pakistanis and the Taliban fomented Islamic
insurgencies, creating hotspots such as Batken in 1999 and 2000, which
compelled Kyrgyzstan to seek assistance from China. Consequently, China
responded through both military and economic aids while inducing the former
to resolve difficult border problems on China’s term.  The Kyrgyz government
is now confronting wide public criticism for signing a secret agreement,
surrendering some large territory to China in 1999. Kyrgyzstan received
substantial military aid, as well as deepened its military contacts with China
during the year 2000.
 Similarly, Uzbekistan’s compulsion to join Chinese led organization came
as a direct response to heightening threat posed by fundamentalist groups like
IMU led by Juma Namangani and Tohir Yuldash. The IMU was supported by
the Taliban and in turn by China’s ally Pakistan. China, under no circumstances,
is expected to use military force against countries where terrorists are bred.
Nor, the Sino-Pak nexus is going to change by India joining the SCO. Instead,
the SCO will become another forum for Pakistan to mislead the Central Asians
on Kashmir.
In the absence of a direct land border with Central Asia, India’s ability to
assert in the SCO will be rather meager. The Forum has been used to voiced
rhetoric against the West, something, which New Delhi could wish to avoid.
Most Importantly, the SCO is a group – composing of communists, autocrats
and semi-democrats, who have little respect for human rights, respect for ethnic
groups and religions. India certainly cannot effort to confuse Turkic nationalism
of Uighur people with Islamic fundamentalism.
India’s policy outlook demands broadening the conceptual parameters of
Central Asia to include wider Eurasian space. Major powers are broadening
their perspectives, as dynamics evolving in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are
increasingly becoming China centric. This is not to suggest India should not
cooperate with China and Central Asian states. It would be imprudent though
for India joining the SCO, a regional framework involving India, China and
Central Asian states minus Turkmenistan could form a viable option for a long-
term cooperation. Several transportation highways, railway lines and pipelines
across the Tian Shan and Pamirs are creating new area of regional cooperation.
Beijing has already prioritized development of Western China in its third phase
of economic reforms. A web of energy pipelines including from Tarim to coastal
China is going to change the regional economic landscape lying north of India.
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As it is, the Afghan-Pakistan route is not available and the much talked about
cooperation through Iran has borne little success, it is time that we factor China
in our Central Asia policy. Above and beyond, India has been a legitimate
player in Central Asia until not so long ago. In the changed circumstances,
India must stake benefit from China’s development plans in Xinjiang and Tibet.
The feasibility of constructing oil/gas pipeline from Central Asia along Western
China connecting to Northern India is now well established. Should this happen,
it would bring about unprecedented strategic change, let alone endowing energy
supplies to entire Northern India.
